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ABSTRACT 
This paper presents the techniques for improving system 
reliability which SEAKR Engineering employs in the design of 
their spacecraft solid state data recorders. Briefly, these 
techniques include Hamming code error correction, periodic 
memory scrubbing, latch-up protection, excessive capacity, 
redundant power supplies/control/bus circuits, microcode 
protection, and shielding. 
INTRODUCTION 
The frequent failures of mechanical tape recorders in 
space applications have shown the need for improved data 
storage products. In addition, the cost of a Flight quality 
tape unit and the problems associated with its torques and 
momentums contribute to the desire for alternatives. For-
tunately, the capabilities of todays semiconductor memories 
provide the means for resolution of these problems. 
Earlier studies 1 - 4 indicated potential methods for 
employing non-rad hard memory technologies in the construc-
tion of memory systems tolerant of the natural radiation en-
vironment of space. Building upon the strategies suggested 
in these papers SEAKR Engineering has constructed and 
delivered a Flight Qualified solid state memory system to a 
DoD program. This paper presents the design philosophY used 
in this system design and the techniques used to increase 
reliability. 
SYSTEM DESIGN PHILOSOPHY 
There are two approaches to providing radiation 
tolerant solid state memory systems. The first and most ex-
pensive is to custom design and manufacture the system's 
memory components in a radiation hard process. Much effort 
and funds have been allocated to this goal resulting in the 
availability, at time of this paper, of volume quantities of 
64 Kbit static RAMs and smaller quantities of 256 Kbit 
static RAMs. 
For small capacity systems, under a few MBytes, these 
densities are workable and can produce competitive data re-
corders. However, with these devices costing more than 
several hundred dollars each, large capacity recorders be-
come prohibitively expensive. A more attractive alternative 
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is to use relatively 
clever system design 
tolerance. 
inexpensive 
to provide 
bulk CMOS devices and 
system level radiation 
This approach has been discussed in earlier papers and 
is being employed in the Mars Observer Cameras, SEAKR 
Engineering's data recorders apply a hybrid of this approach 
using bulk CMOS devices for the memory array and radiation 
hard CMOS SOS for the system control cireui ts. Since the 
majority of devices in a solid state recorder are memory 
devices, this provides a significant cost reduction over a 
full rad hard design while providing the most crucial nodes 
of the system with guaranteed radiation immunity. 
The memory technologies of choice for a spacecraft re-
corder design today are Dynamic Random Access Memories 
(DRAMs), Static Random Access Memories (SRAMs), and Electri-
cally Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories (EEPROMs). 
Due to the need for a periodic refreshing of the data stored 
in a DRAM and the higher susceptibility of DRAMs to ion in-
duced SEUs, DRAMs are the more difficult to use and present 
greater problems in the natural radiation of space. 
However, their lowest cost and highest capacity, typically 
four times that of the highest density SRAM or EEPROM, make 
their use attractive - provided that their problems can be 
overcome. In addition, since the other two technologies are 
easier to use than DRAMs are, a system design supporting 
DRAMs can be easily switched over to support the other two 
technologies. 
RADIATION AND FAULT TOLERANCE 
TOTAL DOSE IONIZING RADIATION 
As demonstrated by JPLs some DRAMs are very tolerant to 
total ionizing radiation. Proper selection of the DRAM used 
in the memory array plus the exclusive use of radiation hard 
components for the rest of the system's microelectronics 
provides significant confidence in the survivability of the 
system. The inclusion of shielding in the recorder housing 
can provide functionality up to several hundred kilo rads of 
ionizing radiation. 
IONIC PARTICLE INDUCED UPSET 
System tolerance to ionic induced SEUs is more dif-
ficult to obtain. Since SEUs have different effects when 
they occur in different parts of the system, the system 
design will require different strategies to survive them. 
Removal of SEUs from the memory array section of the system 
2 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
--
-
is achieved through the use of EDAC circuits, redundancy, 
periodic memory scrubbing, and thoughtful memory array ar-
chitecture. 
The EDAC design employed uses a common 16/6 modified 
hamming code which can detect multiple erroneous bits plus 
correct one single bit error in a 16 bit data word. As data 
is written into the memory array the EDAC circuitry genera-
tes 6 check bits per 16 data bits which become part of a 22 
bit code word. These check bits assist the EDAC circuitry 
in identifying any erroneous data in a code word. 
Since multiple errors in a code word will cause the 
EDAC to fail and since one ionic particle has sufficient 
energy to upset numerous bits within the same chip it is 
necessary to distribute the code word throughout several 
unique devices, one bit per device. While this means more 
words will have erroneous bits per particle hit, it will 
limit each word to only one incorrect bit *1. Passing these 
words through the EDAC circuitry will subsequently remove 
all erroneous bits. 
An additional benefit of this approach is the tolerance 
to hard failures which is obtained. Since the EDAC employed 
will correct all erroneous bits per word and since only one 
bi t per word is stored in the same device, the system can 
continue to function even after losing an entire chip. 
Through software techniques (described in detail by Bob 
Nelson15 and National Semiconductor Applications Note-306) 
SEU tolerance is still maintained providing graceful failure 
to the system. 
This approach has a final benefit in that if a SEU or 
transient occurs in an on-chip address buffer or latch, then 
only one chip will be effected aod the error will appear as 
single bit in nature and can be corrected *2. 
While SEAKR Engineering's memory system can be used for 
random access or data buffer FIFO applications its primary 
market is the replacement of mechanical tape recorders. It 
therefore must be able to maintain data integrity for 
lengthy periods of time before being dumped and subjected to 
the EDAC circuitry. This system usage raises the pos-
sibility of accumulating multiple errors in a single word 
due to independent events separated in time. Our solution 
to this problem is commonly referred to as memory scrubbing. 
By periodically reading all memory words in the system and 
correcting all SEU errors, the probability of accumulation 
of multiple SEUs is decreased. 
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*l NOTE: there is a finite possibility of a single particle 
passing through multiple chips. This may cause multiple up-
sets per data word and subsequently the failure of the EDAC 
design. However, there is very little data to support what 
the probability of this occurrence is. Feedback from this 
recorder's operation during orbit will be presented at the 
next annual symposium and will hopefully shed some light on 
this possibility. 
*, NOTE: This is in contrast to designs which attempt to 
store whole words in one chip and second guess how a single 
particle will effect the stored word. In this competing ap-
proach the single bi t error correction capabil i ty is based 
on the prediction of how a single particle upsets a group of 
bits in the vicinity of the impact. By distributing entire 
words throughout a single chip such that only one bit of any 
word is within the maximum predicted perimeter of impact, a 
single bit error correction scheme can be used to clear all 
error in the entire chip. The fallacy of the approach is 
that if an event occurs in any address register or buffer 
during a write operation good data will have been written 
into a wrong location. In this event not only will data be 
transmitted out of sequence but the system, and thus the 
user, will be ignorant of the fault. 
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IONIC PARTICLE INDUCED LATCHUP 
While the prospects of a Single Event Latchup (SEL) due 
to the nuclear particle environment of space are remote, 
laboratory tests have indicated the possibility. Predicted 
SEL rates for AT&T 1 Mbit DRAMs in the radiation environment 
around MARS have been obtained which indicate that at worst 
this is 8.34xlOE-5 SELjdevice-day.6 A system comprising 
1000 devices in a Martian orbit can be expected on average 
to experience a SEL once every 12 days. 
To prevent catastrophic failure due to the elevated ICC 
current associated with a latchup condition, SEAKR Engineer-
ing employs the common technique of current limiting and 
power strobing. CUrrent limiting resistors on each chip 
hold any ICC current to below the level of damage while 
solid state relays provide the ability to remove power to 
any suspect memory board. 
Activation of the power strobing is initiated by the 
memory system's embedded computer. If during the operation 
of the memory system a fault indicative of a latchup is 
identified on a memory board, then the system will transfer 
the contents of this board via the EDAC circuitry to an 
empty board reserved for this purpose. The power to the 
board in question is now cycled resetting any latchup condi-
tion. The contents of this board are now reloaded removing 
any effect of the latchup. 
MEMORY ARRAY RELIABILITY 
The reliability calculations of the memory array are 
dependent on the assumption that all single event upsets are 
a Poisson process. Namely, they are constant and independ-
ent of past history. Using the definition of the failure of 
the memory array to be when it transmits a single bit error. 
the reliability P(t) becomes the probability that no single 
word in the memory array has a multiple incorrect bit at 
time t. 
With the following definitions 
R = failures/bit-day 
f = failures/bit-sec = R/24*3600 
t = time data is stored in seconds 
T = scrubbing interval in seconds 
w = data bits/word = 16 
c = check bits/word = 6 
m = memory size in number of words. an integer 
n = number of scrubbing cycles during t, an integer 
r(t) = reliability of a single word at time t 
P(t) = reliability of the memory array at time t 
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The reliability of a single bit error correctIng word 
with (w+c) hits is the probability that eith~r all (w+c) 
bits are correct, or that only one blt is incorrect. For a 
Poisson process with the reliability of a single bit defined 
as e-ft a word relia~ility is 1 : 
r( t)=e- (",~ c ) ft +(w+c) (l-e~ it )e- (w+e -1) ft 
and the entire memory reliability becomes [r(t)]m, The 
function of memory scrubbing is to effectively make the 
memory array error free at the conclusion of the scrub ac-
tion. Thus, the reliability of the memory array during the 
first scrub period is the same as the reliability of the 
system in the second scrub period. Therefore, the 
reliability of the system at time nT is the probability that 
it survives each of the n scrub periods. For t=nT the en-
tire memory array reliability becomes: 
P(nT):[ (r(T))' J" 
and for all time, 
Pit) : [(r(T)"J"[(r(x))"J 
for t :;: nT + x, O<x<T; n>O; and n an integer 
Any failure of the memory system EDAC due to SEU is not 
permanent and will become visible as a temporary transmis-
sion of erroneous data measurable as a bit error rate (BER). 
Unlike mechanical tape recorders whose BER is dependent on 
the amount of data transmitted, a solid state recorder BER 
will be dependent on size, SEU rate, memory scrub period, 
and the length of time during which data is stored. 
As an example, consider a solid state system with a 
lOE9 bit memory capacity and a data storage period of one 
day. t therefore becomes 86,400 seconds and the system 
capacity in words is m :;: 4.55xlOE7. SEAKR Engineering's 
current design of the memory system will allow this capacity 
to be scrubbed in approximately 32 seconds, thus T becomes 
32 seconds. 
An expression published by Petersen et al. for the pre-
diction of a bit error at geosynchronous orbit for a 
microelectronic circuit, in upsets per bit-day is R=5xlOE-lO 
x Q/(L)'.' 
Q is the experimental upset cross section [um2 /bit); 
and L is the linear charge deposit threshold [pC/urn]. Rely-
ing on the results obtained by JPL for the AT&T 1 Mbit DRAM 
a cross section is found to be . 353cm2 /bit and a LET of 
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2MeV/(mg/cm 2 ).6 These are converted to 
.02pC/um through a change of units. This 
SEU/blt-day and f=8.1xlOE-lO SEU/bit-sec. 
56um2 Jbit and 
gives R=7xlOE-5 
Inserting these figures into the equation above~ the 
reliability of the memory array becomes 
P(t)=P(day)=O.9811147413. This figure is the reliability of 
the memory system dumping its entire contents without one 
single bit in error due to cosmic particle induced upset. 
Since this reliability figure is calculated for one day, the 
reliability of the system for several years becomes 
P(t)=[P(day)]X with X being mission duration in days. This 
equation shows that for any mission duration longer that a 
few days the probability that the memory array will fail be-
comes significant. 
However, the reliability of the system can be improved 
by lowering the criteria for system failure, namely the BER. 
If we approximate the effective failure of the EDAC circuit 
to be the transmission of two erroneous bits per failure, 
then one failure will give the system a BER rate of 2xlOE-9 
or less. A BER of 4xlOE-9 would allow the EDAC circuit to 
fail twice and a BER of 6xlOE-9 would allow three failures. 
For a SER of lxlOE-8 the EDAC could fail 5 times and has the 
probability of occurrence in one day of approximately: 
Ptail=[l-P(day)]S 
This leads to a probability of successful operation of 
the memory array (SER i lxlOE-8) for a one year mission of: 
Psucess= (1-{1-P{day)]5 )365 
= 0.99999912 
for a six year mission the probability becomes: 
P6 years = 0.9999947 
CONTROL CIRCUITS 
Up to this point this paper has been focused on the er-
ror prone, radiation soft, memory array. All reI iabil i ty 
calculations have been based on the assumption that the con-
trol circuits will function as intended. Strategies taken 
to assure this include thoughtful part selection, an SEU im-
mune address protection scheme, microcode protection tech-
niques} and majority triplication circuits for all command 
and control registers. 
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PART SELECTION 
To guarantee the successful operation of the memory 
system's control cireui ts to the .latural ionizing radiation 
of space, all control circuits have been carefully selected. 
These parts have all been chosen from the limited selection 
of specifically designed, radiation hard, CMOS parts or from 
approved NASA standard parts lists. All of these parts, 
without any shielding, have been shown to be insensitive to 
the exposure of over 100,000 rad of ionizing radiation. BERs 
are 10E-I0 SEU/bit-day or less except for the ASles which 
are 10E-6 SEU/bit-day. 
The control circuits include the system's microproces-
sor, data buffers, program memory, scratch pad RAM, EDAC 
circuits, I/O circuits, gate arrays, all address bus 
drivers, and all data bus transceivers. These devices are 
all manufactured on a latchup immune process such as 80S or 
EPI layer isolation. 
ADDRESS PROTECTION 
Innovative features which SEAKR Engineering has incor-
porated into the recorder design are focused on the preven-
tion of any SEU from causing incorrect memory system opera-
tion. Even thou circuits are employed in the control 
registers and address drivers which are extremely insensi-
tive to SEU it is still possible to experience a cosmic ray 
induced transient. 
This occurrence, when in an address register or on a 
write line, can result in correct data being written into 
the wrong storage cells; possibly overwriting previously 
stored data. Or, if the system is in an output mode of 
operation, data may be transferred out of sequence. This 
problem is the Achilles heel of any solid state memory sys-
tem and one which is frequently overlooked. Since it is im-
possible to eliminate the possibility that an SEU may occur, 
the solution to this problem lies in detection of occurrence 
and then correction of the effects. 
In this design, detection is accomplished by feeding 
the address present at the DRAMs back to the control cir-
cuits and comparing this with the address sent out. Any 
transient or fault encountered in any address driver, either 
going or returning, will be detected. By using two inde-
pendently loaded address counters, one primary counter which 
sends out the address and one secondary counter used for 
comparing the fed back address, a bit flip in either one 
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will be detected alerting the embedded computer. 
ent load requirements prevent any SEU from ever 
both registers simultaneously and identically. 
Inctepenct-
effecting 
All operations to the memory array are halted at the 
detection of any fault in the address checking scheme. In 
an ideal universe with the address comparison instantaneous 
no data would be transferred to or from the memory array 
without the correct address being present. However, in our 
real world with finite delays in transmission and comparison 
circuits it is possible to have an upset and not detect oc-
currence until after sending a read or write pulse. 
Solution of this problem is simplified by the multi-
plexed address design and page operation of a DRAM. In a 
DRAM, two address are required to select a bit the first, 
RAS, selects a row or page in the device and the second, 
CAS, selects the individual cell of this page to read or 
write. Since the device is unreceptive to read or write 
pulses during the RAS address strobe, latent detection of 
an erroneous RAS address presents no problem. Retransmission 
is initiated clearing any DRAM of an incorrect RAS address. 
After a known good RAS address has been loaded into the 
DRAMs then an entire page of data can be transferred by in-
crementing the address and pulsing the CAS line. This 
operation is susceptible to the problem described above; 
however, any error is now bound to the one page in the DRAM 
devices identified by the previous RAS address. By design-
ing the I/O buffers and address counters for full page block 
operation a retransmission of any page will remove the 
failure and be transparent to any user. 
Due to the fact that SRAMs are not page oriented and 
have all addresses present at the time of a read or write 
operation, solution to this problem can only be obtained 
through the reading and writing of the device in its en-
tirety. This seriously complicates the I/O buffer require-
ments of any system based on SRAMs. 
MICROCODE PROTECTION 
In any microprocessor based system, the proper program 
execution depends on the error free operation of the next 
instruction fetch cycle. An upset in the next instruction 
address calculation will cause the program to execute unin-
tended instructions. This type of upset can be caused by 
one or more bit flips in a hardware register called the 
Program Counter (PC). These upsets can be brought about by 
transients and high energy particles. 
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Due to this possibility, it is important that the ac-
tual valid program code have built-in ways to detect and 
correct invalid program operation. SEAKR Engineering recog-
nizes the susceptibility of embedded control programs to 
these error sources and takes the following steps to reduce 
the probability of malfunction! 
1. Use a structured programming format which will allow in-
dividual modules to be tagged with an ID code. Periodically 
checking the ID code against the known correct val ue will 
give confidence that the program counter has not forced a 
jump to another block. 
2. Triplicate operation sensitive variables in rad hard 
RAM. Periodically a background routine will execute to com-
pare the main variable with one of the copies. If the copy 
is identical, the value is written into a third location. 
This third copy of the variable will be used if ever the 
first two do not compare. When this occurs, the first two 
variables are rewritten to match the third. This technique 
protects the program from ever using a variable that has ex-
perienced a bit flip in RAM or was incorrectly stored in the 
RAM. 
3. Periodically repeat control instructions such as Enable 
Interrupts and the loading of external command registers. 
4. Fill unused memory locations with a value equal to a 
Software Interrupt instruction. If program execution im-
properly strays into this region, the Software Interrupt 
code will be encountered and an internal interrupt process-
ing sequence will be initiated. The routine will perform 
the steps necessary to determine where the program went 
astray and will recover to that level. 
5. Protect unused address locations outside of program 
memory. If the data bus is equipped with the proper loading 
resistors to emulate the interrupt code, any illegal access 
to an address not decoded into either program memory or as 
an input will return the desired interrupt code when the bus 
floats during the fetch cycle. Considering that our em-
bedded control program does not use the bulk of the avail-
able address range I this simple method plus 4. above 
provides a good deal of protection. 
6. Include a resettable watchdog timer circuit that can in-
terrupt or reset the processor. Because it is possible for 
unintended program loops to disable interrupts it is better 
to use a Non Maskable Interrupt or to actually toggle the 
RESET line and reset the entire system. 
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The concept is to set the delay on the timer to be 
slightly longer than an anticipated program sequence. At 
the beginning and end of the sequence, the timer is reset. 
If an unintended loop occurs, the timer will time out and 
interrupt the processor. A programmable timer can therefore 
be useful. The time delay can be modified for optimum 
response for different length program sequences. Due to the 
possibility of SEU in a programmable timer, however, a safer 
approach is to use a hardware timer with only a single RC 
time delay that remains fixed. The program must then make 
sure to reset it often enough to avoid a time out. 
7. Set up the memory map so that all of the output 
ports/latches overlap with RAM. This way whenever the latch 
is loaded there will be an identical map of the data that 
was on the bus in RAM. This will not guarantee that the 
latch was loaded properly but it will detect if the data 
byte sent out was as intended. 
HARDWARE TRIPLICATION 
The last technique which is employed in the system 
design to reduce susceptibility to SEU induced failures is 
to triplicate all command registers and latches. Requiring 
the system microprocessor to load each redundant part of the 
registers three times and selecting the majority to follow 
will prevent any SEU from upsetting the command registers 
and causing improper system operation. 
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